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Selfless Time
From life space to death anticipation
Bertrand Urien
ABSTRACT. Time studies in psychology or in consumer behaviour,
traditionally think of the personal future as a Lewinian ‘life space’,
containing several well-known time dimensions: future time per-
spective, future anxiety, and hope. Those dimensions are used to test
the predictive power of various behaviours (attitudinal change,
health behaviour, delay of gratification, etc.) or more specifically:
the temporality of consumer behaviours as implied in consumption
of cultural goods, exploratory consumer behaviour, or mail order
purchasing. However, the personal future is flexible enough to
enable individuals to project themselves well beyond this ‘life space’
into a post-mortem future. In this context, I propose to look at the
concept of death anxiety. Researchers studying the influence of time
representations on human behaviour should not limit themselves to
apprehending the traditional dimension of personal future; they
could integrate an understanding of the future that projects us beyond
physical death. This requires first a close examination of the rela-
tionships between death anxiety and the traditionally applied future
dimensions, and then broadening the scope to various human and
consumer behaviours still unexplained by traditionally acknowl-
edged temporal dimensions. I first present the classical Lewinian
notion of personal future, highlighting some of its aspects, to show
how death anxiety is part of the personal future, and presents major
behavioural impacts. Second, by using structural equation model-
ling, and a multi-group approach, I present an empirical study aiming
to show the nature and the intensity of the links between death 
anxiety and the other traditionally applied dimensions. KEY
WORDS • death anxiety • generativity • personal future • psycho-
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Introduction
‘Temporal consciousness cannot be divorced from the awareness of death.’
With this phrase, Clay Routledge and Jamie Arndt (2005) draw our attention to
the potential contiguity of two fundamental human faculties, thinking about time
and death anticipation. The aim of this article is to integrate death anticipation in
the conceptual structure of our time experience. Close relations between death
and time have already been demonstrated. For example, Held and Nützinger
(1998) and Sabelis (2002) discuss the dominance of ‘clock time’ as the ultimate
mode for conjuration of finitude. However, if we want to expand our scope
beyond relations with ‘clock time’, we should envisage death with other forms
of time experience, also qualified by perception, perspective or temporal 
orientation.1 Very early, the French philosopher Guyau (1890) considered time
as a product of the consciousness and wrote that the past and the future are 
represented. In keeping with the tradition of Lewin (1942), psychologists and
social psychologists such as Fraisse (1967), Nuttin (1980), Raynor and Entin
(1982), have contributed considerably to the structuring and the knowledge in
this field of research. Moreover, among the three temporal zones, the future has
been the object of specific research (Bouffard, 1993; Zaleski, 1996, 2005), as
much as on the means of apprehending and living it cognitively and emotionally
as on its behavioural impact (Strathman and Joireman, 2005). But what future
are we discussing? Since the works of Lewin (1942), most works traditionally
think of the personal future as a Lewinian ‘life space’ (Bergadaà, 1990;
Strathman and Joireman 2005). In psychology for example, this ‘life space’ con-
tains several well-known dimensions that are used to test the predictive power of
various behaviours (attitude change, health behaviour, delay of gratification,
etc.). In marketing and consumer behaviour, other behaviours are tested 
(consumption of cultural goods, exploratory consumer behaviour, mail order
purchasing, etc.). Yet, Boyd and Zimbardo (1997) strayed onto another path by
integrating what happens in the afterlife into their reflection about time. Adam
and Groves (2007) outline the importance of the encounters with death to ‘tame
the future’. Finally, Routledge and Arndt (2005: 59) add that, ‘Being able to
think about the future means being able to think about a future without us in it.’
In keeping with the works of these authors, this article proposes to integrate
death anticipation, and more specifically death anxiety, into the structure of
one’s personal future. On the individual level, this new integration requests first
a close examination of the relationships between death anxiety and the tradi-
tional dimensions of the future, and should then broaden the scope of under-
standing of various human and consumer behaviours still unexplained by
traditional temporal dimensions. If the behavioural impact of death anxiety has
already been studied both in psychology (Tomer and Eliason, 1996) and con-
sumer behaviour (Bonsu and Belk, 2003; Urien, 2003), there rarely have been
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works addressing the topic in terms of time studies. Yet, it is important that
researchers studying the influence of time representations on human behaviour,
and consumer behaviour, should not limit themselves to apprehending the 
traditional dimensions of the personal future but integrate also the future which
projects us beyond our physical death.
This research firstly presents the classical Lewinian notion of personal future,
highlights some of its aspects, shows how death anxiety is part of the personal
future, and presents some of the major behavioural impacts. Second, by using
structural equation modelling, and a multi-group approach, we present an 
empirical study aiming to show the nature and the intensity of the links between
death anxiety and other dimensions of temporal orientation.
Death Anxiety: Personal Future and Selfless Anticipation
‘Man is the only animal aware of his own mortality. Without the awareness of
one’s own finiteness, there can be no consciousness of one’s past – no remorse,
nor nostalgia – and no consciousness of one’s future – in other words, no 
consciousness of time’ (Piettre, 1994: 117, author’s translation). Paul Fraisse, an
eminent psychologist of time, wrote that philosophical reflection had preceded
scientific reflection on a number of issues, and that this process was certainly
still underway. After presenting the work of several philosophers on the links
between death awareness and the representation of time, I will argue how death
anxiety can be integrated into the network of the personal future.
Death awareness and personal future
The subjective experience of time and, more specifically, the representation
humankind has constructed of time, has been one of philosophy’s favourite 
topics. Nonetheless, the variety of ways in which philosophy grasps time should
prompt us to caution. It led Pélicier (cited in Sutter, 1983) to write that all
philosophers have dealt with time without giving any definite answers, since
none of them talk about the same thing. He continues by stating that they are
only philosophers in one particular moment and grasp time on the basis of their
own personal issues that depend on their own life stories and status. While 
time is thought of as a ‘dilation of the soul’ by St Augustine or as an ‘intimate
consciousness’ by Husserl, it is a space of possibilities and action projects for
Heidegger (1927/1986). According to Heidegger, ‘authentic’ time is the open-
ended time of projects; it is the characteristic of human reality to be projected
before one’s own situation. Our relation to time is determined by the tragic fate
of our personal future and the awareness that our future’s limitation, that is, of
the more or less 700,000 hours theoretically at our disposal. ‘Authentic time’ is
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not constructed by the individual alone but is rather the result of his/her aware-
ness of his/her own death: human existence is finite and it is precisely the
‘anticipation of one’s own finiteness’, the co-presence of death – source of 
existential anxiety – that reveals the future, a temporal perspective full of possi-
bilities and plans. French philosopher Marcel Conche (1980: 71) wrote: ‘Death
is my fate. So be it. I anticipate it. I refuse to wait until time passes and let the
future come to me. I anticipate the future; I decide what it will be; I determine it’
(author’s translation). Confronted with the ‘destined power’ of time, several
reactions are possible. Conche suggests that there are several types of illusions
that make it possible to forget about one’s mortality: the ‘religious illusion’
opens up the hope of life after death; the ‘moral illusion’ awards hope of 
eternity on the basis of merit; the ‘social illusion’ works, thanks to prestige,
fame, consideration and glory; the ‘ontological illusion’ relies on possessions
and the ‘apparent consistency of reality’ (author’s translation); finally, with the
‘practical illusion’, oblivion is granted, thanks to action: by focusing on my task,
action makes me forget my own mortality. Thus, from a metaphysical point of
view, death awareness is not only a cornerstone of our awareness of time, but it
also generates behaviours aiming at supporting or abolishing finiteness.
Personal future: From life space to death anxiety
Ever since Lewin, the personal future is considered as a possible extension of
one’s life space. Lewin writes that life space is extended during what he calls
‘the psychological time dimension’. The psychological time dimension of one’s
life space increases from hours, days and months up to years. In other words,
young children live in the immediate present. As they age, an evermore distant
psychological past and future affects their present behaviours. Psychologists of
time, such as Fraisse (1967), Nuttin (1980), Bouffard (1993), Zaleski (1997,
2005) have followed this approach and have shown how several different
dimensions of one’s personal future may affect one’s behaviour. Nuttin even
went so far as to create a theory of human motivation based on the notion of 
personal future. He considers that the future is a pivotal life space, as opposed to
the present and the past, which are of lesser importance. Several dimensions
structure our future. Among these dimensions, the best-known are the future
time perspective (FTP), the consideration of future consequence, anxiety, hope
and future-orientation. The future time perspective represents all the goals of an
individual, that is, ‘all future mental representations associated with an affect’
(Bouffard, 1993, author’s translation). There are two components in the FTP: a
cognitive component and an affective component. The cognitive component of
the FTP is made up of ‘goal objects’ (Nuttin, 1980), which are more or less 
distant from the present. According to Lens (1993), someone whose goals are
mainly located in the immediate future has a limited FTP, whereas someone
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whose goals extend to a distant future has an extended FTP. Moreover,
Strathman et al. (1994) developed a new dimension, the consideration of future
consequences (CFC), which deals with ‘the extent to which individuals think
about the relatively immediate versus distant consequences of their potential
actions’. As for the affective dimension of the FTP, it corresponds to one’s
affective attitude towards the future, which in turn consists of both a positive and
a negative side. The manifestations of the positive side are optimism and hope.
Thus, according to Zaleski (1993), the future, when considered as an environ-
ment conducive to making plans and reaching one’s goals, usually takes on a
positive motivational dimension in that it prompts one to constructive action and
to maintaining it. Snyder (1991) and Snyder et al. (1996) is unquestionably one
of the specialists in the field of hope. The negative affective attitude has been 
considered from the angle of anxiety with regard to the future. Zaleski (1997)
defines it as a state of anxiety, uncertainty, fear, or concern caused by unfavour-
able changes that could occur in one’s distant personal future. Predominant 
temporal orientation is yet another important factor. According to the definition
given by Nuttin (1980), this temporal orientation is the preferential or predomi-
nant orientation of an individual towards one of the three temporal directions:
past, present or future. Thus, if an individual’s centre of interests, concerns or
conversations pertain to the future, he is then said to be future-oriented.
If temporal orientation, in its broader sense, is one of the most fundamental
aspects of humanity, most of the publications devoted to it consider the future as
a Lewinian life space and do not take into account events that may occur after
this life space. Yet for Boyd and Zimbardo (1997) the future can be partitioned
into pre- and post-death time frames. While the traditional psychological and
‘mundane’ future begins in the present and extends to physical death, this 
new notion of a transcendental future starts with physical death and goes on to
infinity. The transcendental future perspective may contain goals such as being
reunited with deceased loved ones, eternal life, reincarnation, etc. According 
to the authors, the transcendental future perspective is a personality trait with
individual differences; it also influences our present behaviour.
The main contribution of Boyd and Zimbardo (1997) has been to free the
future perspective from the physical limit imposed by death. Nevertheless, it is
important to underline that they insist on cognitive components of the transcen-
dental future perspective that are generally positive (being reunited with
deceased relatives, etc.). Just like the classical future perspective has affective
dimensions, be they negative (anxiety towards the future) or positive (hope,
optimism), the transcendental future perspective must have an affective compo-
nent to deal with the anticipation of the absence of one’s self. The present 
article insists on the negative affective component, that is, death anxiety. Death 
anxiety is rarely dealt with from the point of view of time, and yet it belongs to
the network of the personal future (pre- and post-death). Furthermore, this kind
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of ‘selfless time’ has been the topic of important studies dealing with its content
and influence on behaviour.
Death anxiety: A definition
Since the seminal work of Feifel (1955), more than 1,000 papers have dealt with
death anxiety, its definition, its causes and its behavioural consequences. Few
authors, among them Dickstein (1975), Neimeyer (1994), have ventured to
define the concept. On the basis of these various definitions, I will first give my
own definition of death anxiety and then outline its main characteristics. I define
death anxiety as a set of negative emotional reactions of variable intensity
induced by selfless anticipation (Urien, 2003). While many authors qualify
death anxiety as an emotional reaction, Neimeyer (1994) is more precise and,
under the generic name of death anxiety, includes ‘a set of attitudes character-
ized by fear, threat, anxiety, illness, discomfort, or any other similar negative
feeling’. Furthermore, recent attempts at defining death anxiety speak about ‘a
state during which the self does not exist’ (Tomer and Eliason, 1996). In the con-
text of time, we will speak about selfless anticipation. Nevertheless, whereas
early work presented death anxiety as a one-dimensional construct only
(Templer, 1970), at the present time some authors wish to differentiate several
sub-dimensions of anxiety, such as the anxiety regarding one’s physical state
after death, one’s destruction, or the loss of one’s social identity. In actual fact,
according to Neimeyer (1994), it seems that there exists a general anxiety
towards the disappearance of one’s self. This general anxiety can then be sub-
divided according to the kind of thought – pertaining to death – that causes 
anxiety (physical destruction, loss of one’s soul, loss of one’s identity, etc.)
(Urien, 2003).
Selfless Time, Death Anxiety and Behavioural Adaptation
Regarding behavioural reactions, various theories have shown that individuals
develop different means of self-preservation. These means can be direct and/or
indirect, and take the form of physiological necessities and symbols respect-
ively. Theorists of death anxiety have only focused on symbolic forms in their
investigations. In this respect, two major consequences have appeared: the first
was developed in a pioneering theory, the Terror Management Theory (TMT)
(Solomon et al., 1991), which deals with faith in a cultural world-view and self-
esteem, whereas the second deals with generativity and ‘outliving the self’
(Kotre, 1984).
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Selfless anticipation and terror management
First identified by Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski and Sheldon Solomon
(Greenberg et al., 1990), TMT has been the subject of more than 200 empirical
studies. It states that death anxiety is the emotional manifestation of the funda-
mental instinct of self-preservation. Preservation of the self may be fulfilled
through direct means (e.g. remaining healthy, avoiding bad food), but also, more
importantly, through symbolic means related to the individual’s culture. To 
be more precise, there are two symbolic and closely linked self-preservation
mechanisms: (1) unfailing support of world-views and the values of one’s 
culture, and (2) increase in self-esteem – a goal that may be reached by adopting
culturally valued behaviours. Concerning adaptation based on faith in a cultural
world-view, the theory states that we construct a culture and take part in it so as
to minimize the concern associated with death or the loss of self. While culture
can offer immortality through religion, it also contributes to creating a cultural
framework or ‘world-view’ composed of values clearly identifiable by indi-
viduals. As for adaptation grounded on self-esteem, the more an individual 
subscribes to and respects the values of his/her culture, the more his/her self-
esteem increases and the less anxious he/she feels about his/her own death.
Experimental studies have shown that behavioural adaptation, for example,
could lead to: (1) risky behaviour (Orit Taubman Ben-Ari, 2000), (2) conspicu-
ous consumption and greed, (3) pro-social behaviours, (4) a decrease in high-
calorie fatty food intake that has a negative impact on both the body and
self-image (Ferraro et al., 2005).
When selfless anticipation ‘outlives the self’: Generativity
While, for Thomas (1995), ‘generativity answers the human quest for immortal-
ity’, Kotre (1984) considers it to be a kind of ‘outliving of the self’. After 
presenting the concept of generativity, this part will highlight one of its possible
manifestations, that is, ‘time capsules’.
The concept of generativity was first introduced by Erik Erikson (1963) over
40 years ago. ‘Generativity versus stagnation’ is the seventh of the eight stages
in Erikson’s human life cycle theory. It is first associated with the middle adult
years. Bearing and raising children are the first experiences of generativity.
However, a broader definition of this concept includes different life settings,
such as ‘professional activities, volunteer endeavours, participation in religious
and political organizations, neighbourhood and community activism, friendship
and even leisure time pursuits’ (McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1998). McAdams
and de St. Aubin (1998) suggested a typology of generativity that includes 
different generative behaviours (McAdams and de St. Aubin, 1992): creating,
maintaining and offering one’s self. By ‘creating’, the authors mean a generative
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behaviour towards things and people, figuratively and literally giving birth to
both (McAdams et al., 1998). It involves ‘the creation of a product or legacy in
one’s own image . . . a powerful extension of the self (idem)’ (McAdams et al.,
1998: 23) as well. ‘Maintaining’ is another kind of generative behaviour. It 
consists of the conservation or the preservation behaviours that are valued.
McAdams et al. (1998) mention behaviours such as preserving good traditions.
‘Offering’ corresponds to the offering or the gifts of things that have previously
been created and maintained, or the handing down of something or someone 
to the next generation. This can be understood as a way of extending one’s 
existence beyond physical death to reach symbolic immortality. According to
McAdams et al. (1998), ‘generativity is tied up with a society’s overall concep-
tion of time’. If we are talking about creating new things or human beings that
will outlive the self, generativity then deals with the long-term future.
Maintaining, preserving and passing on goods and traditions point to the past.
Therefore, by creating a link between different generations, generativity bridges
the past and the future. Generativity could induce such behaviours as ecologi-
cally friendly behaviour (Urien and Kilbourne, 2007).
An illustration and manifestation of the concept of generativity is the 
phenomenon of ‘time capsules’. A time capsule contains goods and/or informa-
tion that are representative of life at a given point in time, and which could 
be used as a means of communication with people in the future. The common
characteristic of all existing time capsules is probably the need to transcend the
end of one’s personal future by means of a gift that reflects a given period of
time, the need to preserve it and to pass it on to future generations.
I have previously discussed how temporal orientation, and more specifically
the personal future, has been considered and dimensioned almost exclusively as
a ‘life space’. Yet philosophically and psychologically, certain authors show
that the representation of the future cannot be envisaged without integrating the
anticipation of self-absence: death. I have insisted here on the affective dimen-
sion linked to this anticipation: death anxiety. Its main behavioural influences
have also been introduced. In part two, I aim to examine in depth the relations
between death anxiety and certain traditional dimensions of the future. If death
anxiety belongs to the structure of the personal future, what are the links and the
intensity of these links with the traditional dimensions of temporal orientation
and those of the personal future in particular? Is future anxiety linked to death
anxiety? Do individuals orientated towards the future have the same intensity of
death anxiety as individuals orientated towards the past or the present? These are
the questions that the following empirical study will attempt to address.
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Research examples
Few studies deal with the links between different temporal dimensions and death
anxiety. Bascue et al. (1977) have shown, for example, that based on a sample
of 88 77-year-old Americans, death anxiety is associated with an orientation
towards the future (Bascue et al., 1977). Dickstein (1975), based on a sample of
185 American students and using Thematic Aperception Test (TAT) tests to
measure temporal orientation, has shown a link between orientation towards the
past and death anxiety. However, no links were found with an orientation
towards the future. What then are the links with other temporal dimensions? On
other groups? On different age categories? On different cultures? By using other
methodological tools?
This study will contribute to answering these questions by studying more
specifically the links that exist between death anxiety, future anxiety and pre-
dominant orientation towards the future. In contrast with these dimensions
linked to the future, the study of links with an orientation towards the past and
the present will also be integrated. Each construct has been operationalized 
by an indicator of measure and I have used so-called ‘second-generation’ pro-
cessing methods. After validating the different measurement models corre-
sponding to the indicators retained, we will then be able to envisage the links
existing between the different latent factors.
Operationalization of the Constructs and Presenting the Scales
The indicators retained to measure death anxiety, predominant temporal orien-
tation towards the future, the past and the present, and, finally, future anxiety,
are introduced successively.
A measure of death anxiety
The construction of scales to measure this construct has been particularly
developed in recent years due to an interest in a better understanding of the 
individual differences regarding death anxiety, their origins and their conse-
quences. Robert Neimeyer, of the University of Memphis, is currently the 
specialist in this area. Although numerous indicators can be noted at the present
time (for a summary, see Neimeyer 1994, 1997–8), the author, however, high-
lights two important problems: discordant definitions of the concept and a lack
of a theoretical base, to the point that St-Amour and Kiely (2000) ask if the 
function of the death anxiety scale is to define the concept. From the middle of
the 1950s until the end of the 1970s, indirect tests with a projective tendency
were used. Among these tests I note, for example, the 10 ‘TAT’ drawings that
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refer to death (Epley and Rick, 1963, cited in Dickstein, 1975). However, the
creation and the use of these tools rapidly declined, notably due to the cumber-
someness of an important manipulation, a lack of validity and reliability, and the
arrival of much more practical attitude scales that made it possible to directly
apprehend death anxiety. In fact, 95 percent of the studies published in psy-
chology on this topic use these types of test (Neimeyer, 1997–8). Among the
better known, we cite Templer’s (1970) ‘Death Anxiety Scale (D.A.S)’, Colett
and Lester’s (1969) the ‘Fear of Death Scale (F.D.S)’, Neimeyer’s (1994)
‘Threat Index (T.I)’ and Dickstein’s (1975) ‘Death Concern Scale (D.C.S)’.
Moreover, the last scale is composed of 30 items and 2 dimensions: one dimen-
sion representing the conscious meditation of death, and a second dimension
representing a negative evaluation of it. However, only the second factor is con-
sidered as specifically characterizing death anxiety. The other dimension does
not correspond to negative emotional reaction towards death but to the con-
sciousness of it. In addition, a more recent analysis (Klug and Boss, 1976) shows
that the factor relative to death anxiety is only composed of five items. I can also
add here that this factor is apprehended in a general, undifferentiated manner.
Furthermore, this scale is the only one that has been validated to date in a French
context (Urien, 2001).
Measures of predominant temporal orientation and future anxiety
I have chosen Usunier and Valette-Florence’s ‘Times Styles Scale’ (1994) in
order to measure temporal orientation. It should be noted here that in its com-
plete version, this scale measures 4 dimensions and 8 sub-dimensions in 29
items. I have kept the dimensions that seem pertinent for this study, that is, the
predominant temporal orientation towards the past and the predominant orienta-
tion towards the future. This scale offers very good psychometric qualities and
has often been used (partially or completely) on various and numerous popula-
tions and in different cultural contexts (Valette-Florence et al., 2001), resulting
in many relatively recent publications (for a summary, see Usunier and Valette-
Florence in this issue).
This scale does not take into account present-orientation. I have used one of
the dimensions of the temporal orientations scale developed by Ko and Gentry
(1991), and by Gentry (1993) for this specific dimension. The reliability of the
measure of this dimension is adequate (α = 0.74). The authors have attempted to
test the intercultural validity of these scales on two samples (American and 
Thai students) and to explore the sub-dimensions. However, only the present-
orientation appeared to resist an invariance of factors.
Concerning future anxiety, we have used Zaleski’s scale (1996). This one-
dimensional scale, tested and validated on several American and Polish samples,
has good psychometric qualities. It is composed of 29 items in all, 4 of which are
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‘buffers’. Moreover, in order to check the global convergent validity of the scale
in relation to other ones that are conceptually close, the author correlated the
Polish version of this scale with other anxiety scales. The coefficients obtained
show that this type of anxiety is close to traditional conceptions of anxiety, be it
Cattell’s (1966) ‘Overt-Covert Anxiety’ (r = 0.48, N = 88), Taylor’s (1953)
‘Manifest Anxiety’ (r = 0.64, N= 83) or Spielberger ’s (1971) ‘Trait Anxiety’ 
(r = 0.61, N = 135). In fact, if all of these results show that all of these scales
belong to the same network of the conceptual sphere of anxiety, the scale of
future anxiety, however, conserves its own specificity and its own discriminat-
ing utility. Finally, this scale shows encouraging psychometric qualities as well
as a cross-cultural method central to the process of creating a scale.
Validation of the scales used
I have worked from two samples of individuals of French origin: one sample of
349 young adults (average age: 21) and a sample of 302 older adults (average
age: 47). Six hundred and fifty-one questionnaires were then used for the data
analysis. According to the works of Gesser et al. (1987), the individuals in their
40s would have a higher death anxiety than the individuals belonging to other
age groups. In fact, these two samples have multiple interests: they allow us to
have differences in mean age that are important enough to detect a potential
variation in the intensity of the level of death anxiety whatever the meaning of
this variation. It also makes it possible to analyse the stability of relations
between death anxiety and the different traditional temporal dimensions.
Considering the size of our samples and the nature of our variables, I have
retained more specifically the method of estimation according to the maximum
likelihood. Concerning the translation of the scales into French, I have used the
technique of blind parallel translation: each of the three translators involved 
did his own translation from the source language to the target language inde-
pendently, then the different versions were compared and a final version was
made.
Test of the short form scale of death anxiety
As recommended by Klug and Boss (1976), the texts were administered to the
two samples in its original version. An exploratory factorial analysis then made
it possible to keep items whose ‘loadings’ were superior to 0.50 on one factor
and weak on the other factor. My analysis was based uniquely on the dimension
concerning death anxiety. This analysis permitted me to find again the five items
that specifically measure death anxiety. A confirmatory analysis to one latent
factor and five variables of measure was then realized. Validation of the 
measures was done based on the confirmatory analyses. The adequacy of the
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final specified model of measure with the data is satisfactory on the two samples
(comparative fit index [CFI*] of 0.99/0.98). The reliability tests give satis-
factory results. Indeed, the calculation of Joreskog’s ρ gives a result of 0.88 for
the young adults and 0.82 for the older adults. In order to be certain of the con-
vergent validity, I retained only three indictors: a significant link between the
variables of measure and their latent factor, satisfactory criteria of adjustment
and, finally, factorial weights > 0.5. Since all of the criteria have been observed,
we can then conclude that the reliability is good and that the validity of the scale
is satisfactory for the two samples.
Test of the future anxiety scale
The exploratory factorial analysis done on the 25 statements showed the 
existence of a main factor on the two samples. I therefore retained the first 
component and specified a model of measure to one factor. In the end, I obtained
a one-dimensional structure and 13 variables from the 2 samples. These 
variables have a significant liaison with their latent factor. The adequacy of the
specified models of measure with the data is very satisfactory (CFI* of
0.98/0.96). The coefficients of reliability are good (Joreskog’s ρ is 0.90 for the
young adults and 0.92 for the older adults). The Z tests are all significant and 
the supplementary guarantee of convergent validity are given by satisfactory 
criteria of adjustment and factorial weights all superior to 0.5.
Tests of future-orientation, past-orientation and present-orientation scales
After a confirmatory analysis of the items corresponding to predominant 
temporal orientations, we obtain the two dimensions corresponding to future-
orientation and past-orientation on the two samples. The coefficients of reli-
ability are good (ρ of 0.78 and 0.77 for orientation towards the past, and 0.78
and 0.67 for orientation towards the future). With a CFI of 0.95 and 0.97, the 
two specified models have a good quality of adjustment. All of the Z tests are
significant, and all of the statements have a factorial weight > 0.5, which attest
to the convergent validity.
Regarding orientation towards the present, a confirmatory analysis with a
latent factor and 6 variables of measure has been done. An in-depth reading of
the different variables shows that they express an active search for pleasure very
close to hedonism. The quality of the fit index are excellent for both the samples
of young adults and older adults. The indices of reliability are good (Joreskog’s
ρ: 0.86/0.85) and the convergent validity is satisfactory. The quality of the 
indicators of adjustment and the fact that all of the statements except one have a
factorial weight > 0.5 are additional guarantees of convergent validity.
Moreover, the correlation analysis between the different latent factors corre-
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sponding to each of the traditional temporal dimensions mobilized shows that
their discriminating validity is established.
Analysis of the links between the traditional temporal dimensions and
death anxiety
After having examined the psychometric quality of each scale, we can now
envisage a correlational analysis between the different latent factors. Having
two samples makes it possible to observe the stability of the coefficients
obtained. Concerning the quality of the model and considering the lack of 
normality of the data distribution, the robust fit index has been retained. The
value of the CFI (0.91), of the incremental fit index (IFI) (0.91) and the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (0.053) permits us to maintain
that our models possess a satisfactory quality of adjustment.
The analysis of the results shows that death anxiety is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated to future anxiety, orientation towards the past and orientation
towards the future. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient is negative but
significant with orientation towards the present. One will also note that the
intensity of the correlation coefficients is different, depending on the temporal
dimensions, and that these coefficients vary slightly between the two samples.
Moderating effect of age
We will successively study the moderating effect of age on the variation in the
intensity of death anxiety between the two samples, and the variation in the
intensity of correlation links between death anxiety and the other temporal
dimensions studied in this research. This last analysis will make it possible to
know if the slight variations observed are significant or not.
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TABLE 1
Correlations between death anxiety and future anxiety, future-orientation, 
past-orientation and present-orientation 
Death anxiety
Young adults Older adults
(average age: 21 years) (average age: 47 years)
Future anxiety 0.41 0.43
Future-orientation 0.17 0.20
Past-orientation 0.31 0.35
Present-orientation –0.10 –0.12
Note: All of the Z tests are significant, p = 5%
Study of the influence of age on the intensity of death anxiety
We have tested the existence of significant differences between the mean death
anxiety of young adults and older adults. This mean was calculated based on the
summations of the scores obtained on the five items constituting death anxiety.
The results of the univariate descriptive statistics are given in Table 2.
The calculation of the Z test gives us a result of 3.17. Since the result is 
superior to 1.96, the bilateral mean comparison test shows that the differences in
death anxiety are significant, p = 5 per cent. In our samples, death anxiety felt at
47 years of age is then slightly more important than it is felt at 21 years of age.
The influence of age on the intensity of the correlation links between death
anxiety and the other temporal dimensions
According to Byrne’s (1994) recommendations on the subject, studying the
moderating effect of a variable on the links between latent factors amounts to
carrying out a multi-group analysis by testing the invariance of the parameters
of measure and the parameters of correlation on several samples. This is pre-
cisely why I worked with two samples: one made up of young adults, the other
of older adults. In order to do so, I used Lagrange’s test, which evaluates the
effects of liberating the parameters fixed in the initial specified model on 
the decline of the ‘Chi square’, and makes it possible to improve the quality of
the model. I then followed the classical method recommended by Byrne and I
then simultaneously tested the invariance of the measurement models and the
invariance of the correlation links. I set constraints of equality between the 
parameters of measure (coefficients of regression of the different variables of
measure on their latent factor) for the two samples, and constraints of equality
between the parameters corresponding to the correlation coefficients between
the latent factors obtained on the sample of the young adults and those obtained
on the sample of older adults. The analysis of the results show that the quality of
the multi-group model seemed satisfactory on the whole (Chi square = 1458, d.f.
= 763, NFI = 0.901, CFI = 0.902, RMSEA = 0.053). The observation of
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TABLE 2
Results of the univariate descriptive statistics
Death anxiety
Mean = m Standard Deviation = σ
Young adults N= 349 m1 = 9.46 σ1 = 3.85
Older adults N = 302 m2 = 10.39 σ2 = 3.63
Lagrange’s multivariate tests on the ‘constrained’ parameters of the measure of
death anxiety shows none of them are significant. This means that there is
invariance in the instrument of measure on the two samples. However, this
observation of Lagrange’s test on the ‘constrained’ measures of future anxiety
shows that two reductions of the Chi square (out of 13 possibilities) appear 
significant if the constraints of equality are eliminated. There is then only 
‘partial invariance’ (Byrne, 1994) of the instrument of measure of future 
anxiety. Finally, Lagrange’s test is negative on the different constrained 
parameters related to the correlation links between death anxiety and the other
temporal dimensions (future anxiety, orientation towards the future, the present
and the past). This signifies that there is invariance in the intensity of the links.
The slight differences observed between the two samples in Table 1 are then not
significant.
Interpretation of the Results
The analysis of the results is interesting for several reasons. First, I have to admit
that fundamental dimensions such as the predominant temporal orientation and
future anxiety are empirically linked to death anxiety, and this on two samples
of a suitable size. Moreover, these links are stable no matter what the age group.
In a more detailed approach, one will observe at first the important links
between apprehension of the pre and post-mortem future (future anxiety and
death anxiety). If some results have shown positive links between short-term
classical anxiety and death anxiety, my study shows that these links also exist
when anxiety towards a more distinct future is taken into account. If, as stated by
Zaleski (1996), this future anxiety excludes death anxiety in that it refers to a
future that ‘we will live and act in’, death can be, however, considered as a 
singular event of that future; and, life after death as a particular period of the 
latter. The correlation between future anxiety and death anxiety can be inter-
preted in the following manner: the more one is anxious faced with one’s life
space, the more one is anxious faced with one’s death space.
The existence of a liaison, albeit moderate, with orientation towards the future
is initially more surprising. In fact, it can be considered that the fact of being 
orientated in a predominant way by inclination towards one’s future goes hand
in hand with a more acute consciousness of the limits of this future and hence a
more pronounced anxiety regarding it.
The links with orientation towards the past are more pronounced but still 
positive. These results confirm those of Dickstein (1975: 154): orientation
towards the past could be ‘a direct consequence of the consciousness of death
and represents an attempt to be content with the experience and to resist the
rapid passing of time’. Finally, a very reduced negative link with orientation
URIEN: SELFLESS TIME 381
towards the present, stable on the two samples, is observed. The more one would
be anxious faced with death, the less one would be orientated towards the 
present that consists in the active search for pleasure. However, the low intensi-
ty of the links gives a limited significance to these results.
Regarding the modifying effect of age, the result obtained shows that an older
age provokes a slight significant increase in death anxiety. These results are in
accordance with those of Gesser et al. (1987), who have observed the existence
of a curvilinear relation between the two variables, namely, that death anxiety is
highest during mid-life.
Conclusion
The following observation was the starting point of this article: apart from the
work done by Boyd and Zimbardo (1997), work pertaining to the psychology of
time considers the personal future principally as a life space. Yet this personal
future is flexible enough to enable individuals to project themselves well beyond
this life space into a post-mortem future. Therefore, I suggested taking the 
concept of death anxiety into account in the structure of the future. If philo-
sophical reflection precedes scientific reflection, it seems important that
researchers studying the influence of time representations on human behaviour,
for example consumer behaviour, should not limit themselves to apprehending
the future as a life space. It is also important that they explore the personal future
that projects us beyond our physical death and induces behavioural reactions,
such as the ones presented earlier.
The consequences, in terms of future research, present different aspects:
• Beyond the connections with the traditional temporal dimensions of the 
personal future, what are the links with the other future dimensions such as
‘Consideration of Future Consequences’, ‘Future Time Perspective’, ‘Hope’?
• I have studied here the role of age as a moderating variable of the links
between death anxiety and certain traditional temporal dimensions. In spite of
a slight increase in death anxiety during ageing, I have empirically shown that
the intensity of the links with the other temporal dimensions is invariant.
Likewise, studying the role of another moderating variable, such as religiosity,
would be interesting.
• In the present article, I have mainly insisted on the negative affect pertaining
to post-mortem ideas (e.g. loss of social identity). Nevertheless, some authors
underline an aspect that has been rather neglected by academia, namely the
manifestations of death acceptation (Wong, 2000). In fact, one of the possible
means of defending oneself against the anxiety associated with ‘not being
anymore’ is to do away with the desire to ‘be’ by cutting oneself off from the
382 TIME & SOCIETY 16(2/3)
rest of the world. In this case, the question is how are death acceptation and
traditional future dimensions interconnected?
Note
1. Two meanings of temporal orientation are found in the literature: the strict sense of
temporal orientation which corresponds to ‘the predominant orientation’ towards
one or the other traditional temporal zones (past, present, future) and the broader
sense of the term, which encompasses all of the temporal dimensions concerning the
representation of time. The latter is used in this introduction.
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